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ABSTRACT 
Board of director member diversity has an impact on the functions each director successfully 
provides. Appropriate and necessary board member capabilities differ between small and large 
firms. Although these differences seem apparent, current research has favored studies related to 
large firms and neglected those related to board member needs of small firms. Grounded in Agency 
Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, the following manuscript theoretically suggests that 
firm size moderates the relationship between board member diversity and the two primary 
functions (monitoring and the provision of resources) of board members. Furthermore, small firms 
can enhance performance through appropriate member composition in differing ways than large 
firms. 
Keywords: Firm size, Board composition, Resource Dependency theory, Agency theory 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past few decades have led to great 
expansions in technology and available data. 
With that said, the vast benefits of these 
sources also come with some drawbacks, 
particularly in board of director research. A 
great deal of this research has focused on large 
firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2004) leaving 
us, as a field, somewhat speculative as to the 
various impacts that boards of directors and 
boards of advisors may have on small firm 
performance. The board may in fact play 
different roles in small and large firms due to 
differences in monitoring and resource 
provisions, therefore it is necessary to 
consider the integration of these theories (e.g., 
Agency Theory and Resource Dependence 
Theory) (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) as they 
pertain to differences in firm size. As small 
firms may be resource constrained (both in 
information and tangible resources), finding 
and compensating a board may present 
difficulties. Due to these reasons, amongst 
others, the following manuscript attempts to 
answer a handful of questions related to this 
gap in the literature. First, could small firms 
benefit from different board members more or 
less than large firms? Second, does firm size 
have implications on board monitoring and the 
provision of resources?  
To assess these questions, this manuscript 
utilizes prior information on board 
composition as an antecedent to board 
member diversity. Firm size is then described 
as having a moderating effect between board 
member diversity and the functions of a board. 
Next, this paper extends on prior research 
through the integration of Agency Theory 
(AT) and Resource Dependence Theory 
(RDT) (Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) to better explain the 
dual board functions, monitoring and the 
provision of resources, respectively. The 
results ultimately lead to a final proposition 
suggesting a means for small firms to enhance 
firm performance through strategic board 
member selection. 
This research contributes to the literature in 
three primary ways. First, it is of interest to the 
collective body of board of director research 
to better understand differences between large 
and small firms. Because small firms have 
been somewhat neglected in this body of 
work, this manuscript addresses the need to 
advance the discourse as pertaining to various 
firm sizes. Secondly, as developed through the 
integration of two theories and various aspects 
of boards of directors, attention is drawn to 
more careful consideration of board selection 
in small firms. Lastly, this research provides 
practical means for small firms to enhance 
performance. Because an overwhelming 
majority of firms are small (U. S. Census 
Bureau, 2012), this issue applies to the great 
majority of businesses in which the 
effectiveness of the board is a socially 
complex phenomenon both within the firm 
and with external constituencies.  
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
Agency Theory and Boards 
Essentially, AT utilizes “alternative 
governance structures to mitigate the agency 
conflict” (Kochhar, 1996: 715) and is used to 
identify the problems that may occur as 
managers, rather than owners oversee 
business operations. As Eisenhardt (1989) 
points out, the agency problem occurs when 
principals and agents have different desires 
while at the same time are embedded in a 
context presenting difficulty for principals to 
verify agent behavior. To minimize these 
agency problems, two governance 
mechanisms are emphasized: incentive 
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compensation and governance structures 
(Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
 
The emphasis of this research, as it pertains to 
AT, will focus on monitoring, being that 
monitoring the structure and composition of 
the boards of directors is a primary function 
marrying AT and boards. Here, stockholders 
can use boards of directors as a mechanism for 
monitoring executives (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Many researchers (e.g., Baysinger & 
Butler, 1985; Daily, 1995) have given 
preference toward independent outside 
directors to make up board composition in 
order to better satisfy the monitoring function. 
Such a scheme suggests insiders would not act 
independently and therefore compose a board 
weaker in monitoring management whereas 
nonaffiliated directors provide stronger 
monitoring as the disincentive to monitor is 
removed (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Although 
AT is the most widely used theory when 
focusing on boards of directors (Dalton, Hitt, 
Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Hillman, Withers, & 
Collins, 2009; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstand, 
1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), much of the AT 
literature on boards of directors has 
undertaken samples of large public companies 
to analyze the monitoring mechanism (e.g., 
Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998; Nyberg, 
Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010). 
However, this is not the boards’ only 
application, albeit perhaps being the most 
straightforward. Boards can also monitor 
firms in smaller private organizations, a focal 
point of this paper.  
 
 
 
2 Institutional Theory may indicate that boards are 
assembled to manage legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
Resource Dependency Theory and Boards 
Given firms work in an open and interacting 
environment (Thompson, 1967), they are 
situated in a context full of uncertainty and 
interdependence (Knight, 1921; MacMillan & 
Katz, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). It is 
here where managers have the ability and 
obligation to attempt to control for this 
uncertainty and to reduce various 
dependencies. Gaining and maintaining power 
is focal to reducing dependency. Emerson 
(1962) provided the groundwork for the 
concept of power dependence which was later 
applied in the organizational setting to control 
for resources (Ulrich & Barney, 1984).  
 
Studying boards of directors through a RDT 
lens leads to great benefits and many studies 
have asserted that RDT has provided for a 
better understanding of boards through 
theoretical and empirical analysis2 including 
topics such as board size and composition 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer, 1972). Directors 
with access to various resources provide 
valuable impacts at the firms in which they sit 
(Boyd, 1990). These resources are not one-
dimensional and in fact, can be broken down 
into a number of subcategories. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) provide insight to the four 
primary ways in which directors add value to 
organizations. These include: advice, 
legitimacy, and access to information and 
resources. These categories, as applied to 
small and large firms will be further 
differentiated later in this manuscript. 
Notably, more recent research follows this 
trend. Hillman and colleagues developed a 
taxonomy also suggesting directors provide 
varying degrees of expertise and resources in 
RDT roles. (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000). 
We note this importance and consider IT to be 
subsumed under RDT in the present context. 
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Although some point out the limitations of 
RDT (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), it has 
stood the test of time providing a sociological 
theoretical underpinning and explaining a 
great deal in strategic management. The RDT 
presence in corporate governance is quickly 
approaching the prominent AT perspective. 
While each theory provides a unique 
perspective, the collaboration of the two 
provides a more complete lens to view the role 
of the board of directors.  
RDT and AT 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) were seminal in 
integrating these theories as they pertain to 
corporate directors. They differentiate the two 
functions of corporate directors by 
underpinning the monitoring function in AT 
and the provision of resources function in 
RDT. Others have also more recently 
integrated these theories for various 
governance purposes. Arthurs and colleagues 
(2009) focus on mitigating the agency and 
resource dependence challenges and examine 
governance mechanisms when firms enter the 
IPO stage based on their resource 
dependencies. Amongst other conclusions, 
they find that when ventures are dependent on 
key entrepreneurs, firms seek directors with 
greater start-up experience and a higher level 
of contingent compensation (Arthurs, 
Busenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009). By 
also integrating AT and RDT, Callen, Klein, 
and Tinkelman (2009) find that the theories 
are complementary yet address different 
components of nonprofit performance, but 
with the caveat that RDT produces stronger 
statistical results. This section is not to provide 
an entire literature review, but rather 
emphasize the seminal work of Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003), while also providing the work 
of like-minded scholars more recently 
merging these two theories with emphasis on 
corporate governance. This manuscript looks 
to follow suit in a similar integrative fashion 
yet in a different context with greatest 
emphasis toward small firm board 
composition recommendations. 
FORMAL PROPOSITIONS 
Firm Size 
Firm size is a dimension of the meta-analysis 
conducted by Dalton and colleagues (1998). 
Although they focus more specifically on the 
influence of the insider versus outsider board 
member, they explicitly note that firm size is 
important. Through the lens of firm size, it is 
suggested that a larger firm would mask the 
impact that a board might have (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton & Kesner, 
1983). However, larger firms have great 
complexity and hence potentially greater 
uncertainty. Under the RDT umbrella, this 
may increase the need for desired 
relationships to control for these complexities 
and uncertainties (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In 
their meta-analysis (Dalton et al., 1998), they 
continuously point to the complexities that 
arise in dealing with larger firms, not only 
from the RDT perspective, but also from an 
agency perspective as CEOs may try to 
carefully control the information given to the 
board.  
Smaller firms may provide boards with greater 
influence over the firm (in comparison to 
larger firms) (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1993; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). 
Accordingly, this might lead to more thorough 
monitoring and better utilization of provision 
of resources provided by the various directors. 
From the perspective of board contributions, 
this may lead smaller firms to more efficiently 
capitalize on resources as well as more readily 
adjust their strategies (Dalton et al., 1998). 
Interestingly, despite this potential for 
improving firm performance for smaller 
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firm’s utilization of board members, little 
research has been conducted in this area 
(Bennett & Robson, 2004; Kroll, Walters, & 
Le, 2007; Nelson, 2003; ) and Filatotchev and 
Bishop (2002) allude to the potentially 
different governance structures based on firm 
size.  
Small and large firms may face different 
competitive situations, dynamics, and needs 
from their board members. For the purposes of 
this paper, precisely defining small and large 
firms is not overly necessary. The present 
concern is directed toward the needs of small 
firms, and since they have been under-
represented in the studies on both governance 
and boards of directors, the aforementioned 
and following rationale will hopefully help to 
build some better practices for small 
businesses to consider when designing and 
creating their board of directors (or in some 
cases, board of advisors).  
Board Composition 
Board member composition has been studied 
over multiple decades and has been intensely 
analyzed to find whether or not differences in 
composition impact various issues such as 
performance (e.g., Baysinger & Butler, 1985; 
Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson, & Ellstand, 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989), ownership structure (Kroll et al., 2007), 
bankruptcy (Gales & Kesner, 1994), and 
leadership structure (Dalton et al., 1998) to 
name just a few. Others have more specifically 
addressed issues within compositions such as 
the impact of outside directors (Peng, 2004), 
balancing family influence (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2004), shareholder wealth and dividend 
policies (Schellenger, Wood, & Tashakori, 
1989) and so forth. However, because meta-
analyses have shown unclear linkages 
between board composition and performance 
(Dalton, et al., 1998), this may suggest the 
need to further incorporate moderating 
variables such as firm size in order to examine 
other contextual factors. 
Many authors conclude that greater 
proportions of outside directors lead to more 
effective boards (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; 
Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), with 
the term effective implying some form of firm 
performance. This is a clear case of an AT 
presence in that outside directors will better 
monitor CEO and/or top management teams 
through separating ownership and control 
(Dalton et al., 1998). Although stewardship 
theory is not a focus of this manuscript, there 
is also some support from this theory that in 
fact, inside directors would actually make for 
better board members (Davis et al., 1997; 
Kesner, 1988). Sharing this news however is 
no way ground breaking and there have been 
many contradicting studies and little 
consistency with regard to board composition 
on firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998). As 
identified by prior integrative models (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989), composition also consists of 
more than just an inside/outside director 
comparison. Size and minority representation 
are also common considerations. Although 
there have been some differences addressed in 
prior research, the great breadth and depth of 
the various composition findings lead to the 
belief that composition is in fact important, 
and the board make-up will have an impact on 
monitoring and the provision of resources.  
While prior research has attempted to address 
board composition via outside versus inside 
members, one area of board composition 
worthy of further exploration is the 
differences stemming from gender. Presently, 
there are no studies outlining these differences 
at the board member level despite the 
extensive literature base outlining differing 
levels of new venture start-up and resulting 
firm performance between women and men 
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entrepreneurs (Fairlie & Robb, 2009; Kelley, 
Brush, Greene, & Litovsky, 2013; Lerner & 
Almor, 2002). By using gender as a lens to 
assess board composition, we offer insights 
into how the strategic planning and business 
experiences may shed further light on the 
human capital resource gap between women 
and men owners (Fairlie & Robb, 2009).  
Effective strategic planning may be critical for 
newly created businesses and vital in the 
growth of existing firms (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2003). A dynamic planning process 
can play an important role in predicting firm 
performance (Brinckmann, Grichnik, & 
Kapsa, 2010). In addition, prior research 
suggests that women invest in strategic 
planning to augment business performance 
(Lerner & Almor, 2002). While men also 
engage in strategic planning, the strategic 
focus of the planning efforts for women may 
be different than that for men (Gibson, 2010). 
The planning horizon for women typically 
spans further into the future, when compared 
with that of men who are more short-term 
focused (Sandberg, 2003). These differences 
in focus are likely to lead to differences in 
management values between men and women 
business owners (Carter & Cannon, 1992). For 
instance, men are more likely to measure the 
success of their strategies via quantitative 
measures such as profitability and market 
position, while women are more likely to 
measure the success of their strategies more 
qualitatively, such as personal satisfaction and 
customer service (Van Aueken, Gaskill, & 
Kao, 1993). As a result of these differences, 
the path to business success for female 
entrepreneurs is likely different than the path 
experienced by that of male entrepreneurs.  
Bennett and Robson (2004) noted that 
experience, advice, and expertise are 
consistently ranked as the top reasons board 
members are asked to serve. Given this, 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) contend that these 
experiences shape executive perception. In 
other words, the decisions made by owners 
and board members alike, are shaped by one’s 
collective experience.   
A review of the literature has identified 
numerous differences between male and 
female entrepreneurs, but do these differences 
also transfer to the board room? We purport 
that the differences in experiences may lead to 
different cognitive perceptions for the board 
member and hence, do transfer. For example, 
female entrepreneurs have more difficulties 
with raising start-up capital (Carter & Cannon, 
1992) and securing loans (Verheul, Risseeum, 
& Bartelse, 2002). As a board member, a 
female with these experiences may be willing 
to risk less capital for business growth due to 
perceptions of capital availability. This risk 
aversion may lead to initially lower returns, 
however, Robinson (2007) found that women 
owned businesses are less likely to end in 
bankruptcy, when compared with the 
businesses run by men. Johnston (2013) 
offered support along this line of rationale and 
concluded that female entrepreneurs, in many 
instances, exhibit stronger ability in handling 
workplace pressures.  
We included a question in this section, “do 
these differences transfer to the board room?” 
Cognitive behavior of any executive, 
including board members, is influenced by an 
individual’s experience. “Modes of thinking 
are gender-specific” (Rowley, Lee, & Lan, 
2015: 206). Given this journey, the 
experiences and expertise of the individual 
will be different for women than for men. 
Therefore, the perceptions and cognitive 
behaviors that form the foundation of his or 
her cognitive processes will influence how an 
individual views and engages in monitoring 
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and the provisioning of resources. In 
accordance with RDT, companies should 
select board members based on the 
individual’s ability to help address the 
company’s needs (Valenti, Mayfield, & Luce, 
2010). Given the differences in female and 
male entrepreneurial experiences, we contend 
that small firms should consider gender, along 
with outside versus inside expertise when 
evaluating board composition.  
The composition of the board impacts the 
characteristics of board members (Dalton et 
al., 1998; Provan, 1980). Relevant dimensions 
of board of director diversity can come in 
various forms such as education, training, and 
work experience (Zald, 1969), as well as 
through interlocks (Mizruchi & Stearns, 
1988), stakeholder positions (Hillman, Keim, 
& Luce, 2001), political experience (Hillman, 
2005) and so forth. The characteristics that 
members possess have important implications 
regarding the capabilities which they may be 
able to offer a firm. As imagined, these 
characteristics can make a board more or less 
diverse and have been fairly well studied and 
synthesized over the course of the past few 
decades (Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 
1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
These characteristics play a considerable role 
in accomplishing their responsibilities 
involving control, service, and resource 
dependence (Johnson et al., 1996). Various 
studies were conducted over the past four 
decades which helped to identify important 
board characteristics (Vance, 1968) and 
beliefs and attitudes (Norburn, 1986) that help 
to make them more successful (Sonnenfeld, 
2002). Ultimately, many would argue that the 
characteristics may lie in their abilities to 
monitor and provide resources (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). Thus, as firms realize that 
individual members provide various skills, 
firms will likely attempt to attain properly 
diverse boards to utilize these varying 
strengths as pertaining to the firm needs. This 
is particularly important for smaller firms 
because they typically have fewer employees, 
a less diverse workforce, and fewer skills sets. 
However, creating diverse boards with a 
combination of inside and outside directors, 
men and women, and varying skill sets can 
help boards reduce this gap. Additionally, 
empirical studies show that this diversity of 
board of directors is significant for the 
strategic planning of small firms (Robinson, 
1982). While the CEO of a large firm is tasked 
with the role of leading the firm’s enterprise-
wide strategy, small business owners are 
forced to deal with daily operational issues, 
and any planning that does occur is much more 
ad hoc. Through the board, a small firm can 
formalize its planning process, allowing it to 
achieve better returns (Ackelsberg & Arlow, 
1985). Thus, the board of a small firm inherits 
some of the role traditionally performed by a 
top management team of large firms, in which, 
heterogeneity has shown to be positively 
related to firm performance (Hambrick, Cho, 
& Chen, 1996). Accordingly, we present the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1: In comparison to large 
firms, small firms can gain a greater 
and more impactful access to skills and 
resources through board member 
diversity. 
Board Functions 
As alluded to in the theoretical development, 
this manuscript adopts the perspective of 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) in that boards take 
on two primary functions: monitoring through 
an AT perspective or providing resources 
through the RDT perspective. However, why 
does it have to be either-or? As they (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003) eloquently integrated the 
theories, note that it doesn’t necessarily have 
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to be either-or, but that the two theories can 
work together to provide a valuable alternative 
to the conflicting camps.  
Others have also followed suit in integrating 
these two theories when it comes to 
governance (Arthers et al., 2009) and boards 
(Callen et al., 2009) which is also the lens this 
manuscript will pursue. The merger of these 
perspectives allows for an interesting 
interconnection between the two which better 
explains what may occur for boards at small 
firms. Members with access to resources will 
not only provide the firm with at least some 
level of access to these resources, but these 
resources will also influence their capabilities 
for monitoring. That being, the essence of 
monitoring is integrated into the resources that 
these board members have at their fingertips. 
Meaning, the two are not mutually exclusive 
albeit we can address them separately in the 
following sections.  
Monitoring 
Despite the interrelationship, these two 
functions may each have their own respective 
roles pertaining to firm size. Monitoring is the 
mechanism to help reduce the agency 
problem. This is also often referred to as the 
control role (e.g., Boyd, 1990; Hillman, 
Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008) and is a 
fundamental function of each board. Each 
director is responsible for this at least to some 
extent. This function looks out for the various 
stakeholders whom can be separated into 
many different groups depending on the firm 
(shareholders, owners, etc.). Because a 
primary function is to align the investor’s 
interests with that of the manager, incentive 
pay is often tied to manager compensation to 
better align interests between the two parties 
(Garen, 1994). However, are differences in 
agency problems and monitoring mechanisms 
in large and small firms more similar or more 
different? 
Monitoring relies heavily on the board of 
directors (e.g., Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Furthermore, in larger firms where there are 
likely more employees, managers, executives 
and so forth, the monitoring function increases 
in complexity as there is more personnel to 
oversee. Additionally, CEOs and managers 
are less likely to be owners in larger firms. 
Conversely, the monitoring function differs in 
smaller firms due to the nature of their 
ownership structure. Small firms are more 
likely to have hands-on owners (Reynolds, 
2004), have less disconnect between investors 
and owners due to small bank lending 
(Jayaratne & Wolken, 1999) and internal 
funding (Hamilton & Fox, 1998), have 
compensation plans naturally integrated into 
firm performance more comparable to other 
staff (Tice, 2011), and finally, have fewer 
owners and managed by the owners. Although 
agency costs are not fully removed in small 
firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 
2001), there are fewer principal-agent 
contracts to monitor in small firms. From this, 
the traditional monitoring role of the board is 
lessened, which allows the board of a small 
firm to focus on other strategic issues.  
Proposition 2: Monitoring functions 
will differ based on size of the firm such 
that monitoring will play a lesser role 
for boards of directors in smaller 
firms.  
Furthermore, such monitoring plays a smaller 
collective role in smaller firms, the 
responsibilities of this function are in fact 
quite different for directors in small firms 
versus directors in large firms. For instance, 
because larger firms are more likely to be 
traded on various stock markets, monitoring 
directors who are more knowledgeable in 
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finance and trading will have greater 
capabilities in monitoring (Xie, Davidson & 
DaDalt, 2003). Large firm board members 
who are more familiar of complex structures 
(e.g., through experience) will also have 
greater capabilities in monitoring the greater 
variety of C-level and upper management 
positions (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). 
Alternatively, director members of small firms 
may have greater monitoring capabilities if 
they are familiar with the industry in order to 
benchmark the managing position against that 
of other similar firms (Rosenstein, 1988). 
Furthermore, small firm board members 
familiar with general small business practices 
and principles will also provide greater 
monitoring capabilities to these sized firms 
due to their exposure and valuable experiences 
in similar capacities. Accordingly, in addition 
to the greater collective focus on monitoring 
in large firms, board member specific 
capabilities may vary and the variance in these 
capabilities may better lend themselves to a 
certain firm size.  
Proposition 3: Firm size will moderate 
the relationship between member 
diversity and the monitoring demands 
such that large firms will place greater 
emphasis on finance and structure 
knowledge to monitor while small 
firms will place greater emphasis on 
industry and small business knowledge 
to monitor. 
 
Board members are appointed for different 
reasons between small and large firms (Coles, 
Daniel, & Naveen, 2012). The process is more 
formal in large firms where stock prices may 
react to the appointments (Shivdasani & 
Yermack, 1999); and are also more likely to 
be conducted based on outside 
recommendations separate from what the 
CEO and managers may desire (Shivdasani & 
Yermack, 1999). However, in a small firm, 
often the owner(s) who manages the firm 
assembles the board of directors (Vesper, 
1990). Under these circumstances, boards for 
small firms are more likely to be tied to the 
owner which develops from a smaller circle of 
possible board members (Mosakowski, 1998). 
They are likely chosen more for their 
provision of resources and less for the 
monitoring capabilities and thus we present 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: Small firm boards will 
have less autonomy over monitoring 
because directors will be more likely 
owner appointed. 
 
Provisions of Resources 
The provision of resources allows for board 
members to reduce uncertainty in the firm 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resources provide 
firms with access to human capital and 
network capital. Although perhaps not fully 
developed, RDT and boards have received 
notable attention. Hillman and colleagues 
(2000) suggested the various roles could be 
broken down into insiders (e.g., firm 
knowledge), business experts (e.g., expertise 
on competition), support specialists (e.g., 
experience in law or banking), and community 
influentials (e.g., influence, power, 
legitimacy). (Hillman et al., 2000). The 
combination of these resources can make 
board members very valuable to the firm. As 
mentioned, those board members with greater 
access to resources may also be networked and 
interlocked with other board members not 
only gaining the firm access to resources, but 
also providing board members with the 
knowledge to better monitor. Whereas 
monitoring keeps activities in check, 
provision of resources can provide a whole 
new wealth of capabilities (Arthurs et al., 
2009). As monitoring was suggested to play a 
larger portion of the director activities in the 
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larger firm, resource dependence roles may 
likely represent a greater role in smaller firms. 
Proposition 5: The provision of 
resources function will differ based on 
size of the firm such that the provision 
of resources will play a larger role for 
boards of directors in smaller firms.  
All firms need access to resources but the 
following paragraph posits that smaller and 
larger firms will have much different needs 
from these resources. For example, a smaller 
firm might be very pleased to find out board 
member X is (or knows) a lawyer that could 
draft legal documents. This differs from large 
firm Y which likely has internal corporate 
attorneys to draft such documents. In smaller 
firms, directors’ capabilities are sometimes 
used in lieu of recruiting full-time employees 
(Bennett & Robson, 2004). Cost concerns 
(e.g., salary and benefits) and moving new 
associates down a learning curve to help them 
understand the business could be 
counterproductive to the business in the short 
term. Hence, creating an opportunity for the 
director at a smaller firm to engage with the 
owner in operating the business alleviates this 
concern in the short-term. Engaging in 
operating the business creates an additional 
demand on one’s time for smaller firm 
directors versus large firm directors, hence 
assisting the owner by “stewarding” for the 
business and providing skills and expertise.  
Endless applicable examples could be listed, 
but providing readers with one should give an 
idea that although resources remain an 
important contribution made by board 
members, various resources and specifics 
about these resources will greatly differ based 
on the needs that the firm has as dependent on 
its size. Based on the prior listed fundamental 
resource areas (Hillman, et al., 2000), small 
firms will derive significant value from all 
four areas (e.g., insiders, business experts, 
support specials, and community influentials) 
whereas large firms are more concerned with 
emphasis on business experts (Singh, 
Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008) and 
community influence (Huang, Vodenska, 
Wang, Halvin, & Stanley, 2011).   
Proposition 6: Firm size will moderate 
the relationship between member 
diversity and the resource demands 
such that there should be a greater 
emphasis on networks in large firms 
whereas well-rounded access to 
various resources in smaller firms.  
DISCUSSION 
Small business makes up a great deal of the 
American economy (U. S. Census Bureau, 
2012) and hence the implications for this type 
of research are important and widespread. 
With attention to board of director members 
and even boards of advisors, small firms can 
set themselves up to have better monitors and 
have access to great and pertinent resources in 
order to reach their potential whether that be 
profits, growth, market share, or goals (for 
non-profit small firms). The combination of 
these two functions will lead firms to achieve 
these varying goals. Additionally, 
management may be positioned to make better 
strategic actions and decisions by better 
aligning boards through diversity and relevant 
experience. Ultimately, addressing these 
needs will better prepare a small firm for 
success in comparison to other small firms that 
more arbitrarily (or less thoughtfully) develop 
their boards. In essence, comprehensive 
attention to these potential firm resources 
(monitoring ability and provisions of 
resources) can lead to better firm performance. 
This is not to overlook larger firms and the 
attentiveness they should give to selecting 
their board of directors. More so, to note that 
the selection of each member should be 
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careful and in a manner that can help lead to 
better performance due to the differing needs 
of smaller firms. As we also mentioned, small 
firm board members receive much less (if any) 
compensation and thus the nature of acquiring 
talented individuals who can appropriately 
serve becomes a more challenging but 
worthwhile endeavor. Therefore, all else 
equal, small firms which put forth the effort 
and successfully comprehensively capitalize 
on both their monitoring and resource 
provisions will have better performance over 
other small firms which do not. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are a few limitations that should be 
noted. First, as a theoretical piece, many of the 
propositions remain untested. Though the 
suggestions are underpinned in prior research 
and theory, it is difficult to say what exactly 
would be the ideal board member and 
composition for small firms. Secondly, due to 
the wealth of research conducted regarding 
boards, RDT, AT, and firm size, as well as 
stewardship theory, it was not feasible to 
survey and include all of the literature. 
Although this manuscript draws attention to 
differences in size, there is additional 
literature along with data that would have led 
to a more comprehensive study as to what 
small and large firm need from their boards of 
directors. Relatedly, while it was convenient 
for us to consider firms as small or large, some 
limitations (as well as future research) exist 
due to our dichotomous rather than continuous 
frame of reference. These are our greatest 
limitations; admittedly, others are also likely 
to exist. 
Future research could include a more 
comprehensive look at firm size (i.e., more 
than two groups). This might lead researchers 
to find fundamental differences at various 
levels rather than by simply distinguishing 
between small and large firms. For example, 
some studies trichotomize firm size (e.g., 
Roza, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2011), but 
even this procedure may not catch all of the 
possibilities and nuances. Additionally, firm 
size may change over time as a firm evolves 
out of the start-up phase. It would be 
beneficial to know more about how board 
composition changes as firms grow, stabilize, 
or decline in size and if they conscientiously 
seek out different types of board members. 
Our research suggests they should, but 
knowing more about the results when they do 
would be helpful to firms that are undergoing 
size fluctuation. Second, testing these 
propositions could provide for empirical 
validity in addition to the prior theoretical 
rationale. To do so, one could likely obtain 
data on large firms through secondary data, 
such as the board analyst database. However, 
for the smaller firms, surveys or some other 
means of primary data collection would likely 
be necessary. 
Broadly speaking, the board of director 
literature within corporate governance has 
given much greater emphasis to the large firm. 
It is now time for small firm board research to 
catch up. Collecting data for the small firms is 
a necessary step in order for small businesses 
and entrepreneurs to have a better grasp on 
their needs from a board of directors or a board 
of advisors and a means in which they can find 
greater success.  
Practical Implications 
The concepts discussed in this manuscript 
should help lead to a better and more full 
understanding as to what a firm may need 
from their board members. The practical 
implications of this research may present 
greater advancement for small firms for it is at 
this level that the board member resources can 
be better tested in the future. As suggested, 
small firms may want to pay particularly close 
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attention to the resources each member is able 
to provide. It is also at the small firm level 
where many of the board members are often 
affiliated with the owners which may impact 
monitoring. Addressing these items and laying 
out what a small firm needs from their board 
of directors or board of advisors is critical. 
Through appropriate planning, small firms 
may be accordingly provided with greater firm 
performance.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In following suit with others (e.g., Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003), the preceding content 
attempted to theoretically merge AT and RDT 
as a means to distinguish between board of 
director functions and address the moderating 
effect of firm size. As argued, the function of 
monitoring and function of the provision of 
resources should be addressed differently 
based on firm size. Lastly, it is suggested that 
meeting these demands could help provide for 
enhanced firm performance while calling 
more specific attention to small firms. It’s with 
hope that this work leads to the three 
suggested contributions: address differences 
in firm size in corporate governance, provide 
attention to strategic small firm board 
membership, and offer some practical 
applications to the many small firms looking 
to improve performance outcomes. 
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